

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST OCCURS WITH  
DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES**

by

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## ABSTRACT

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When protracted conflicts stalemate, solutions then placed on hold for decades, stability begins to erode in regional relationships bringing additional conflicts as an unintended consequence. At the beginning of 2005 new opportunities find the United States taking a more active approach once again. As in other parts of the world, the U.S. needs to play an active role in formulating solutions to world problems affecting vital U.S. interests, pressing forward in areas, like the Israeli-Palestinian situation, where regional discord converges so sharply with U.S. national interest.

The U.S. has a great opportunity to again attempt solution due to two significant new occurrences that have opened new avenues for progress. From the Israeli perspective, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's controversial, unilateral proposal in April 2004 to pull out of Gaza and parts of the West Bank is accompanied with problems (unilateral approach) and strings (statements that other settlements will never be moved). But coupled with Sharon's agreement to President Bush's call for an independent, viable Palestinian state, this response still represents a major shift in attitude

The other major change has come with the death of Yasser Arafat, prompting new Palestinian Authority leadership to focus on achieving the now commonly accepted goal of a viable end state and implementing actions to stop the violence. President Mahmoud Abbas, a figure in the PLO that is considered legitimate by both sides and carefully maintaining his relationship to the late chairman, was free and fairly elected in January 2005.

For a true peace, the underlying problems must be addressed through honest negotiations, not through the military solutions of overwhelming might and suicide bombings, no matter how de-stabilizing the process leading to that negotiated solution is going to seem.



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## PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST OCCURS WITH DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES

When protracted conflicts stalemate and solutions are placed on hold for decades, stability begins to erode in regional relationships, bringing additional conflicts as an unintended consequence. The 21<sup>st</sup> century has several: Northern Ireland, Kashmir, Cyprus, Korea, and perhaps even various colonial boundaries remaining from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Do any have some common ground for settlement when the partners have continued so long with the status quo? These situations presume an endstate of constant instability. They consume world attention with their constant threatening immediacy and prevent resources from being more suitably focused on other world problems. When U.S. policy remains focused on engagement and the search for solutions, the stalemates have been reduced.

Based alone on its far-reaching effects, the most critical conflict facing the world is the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the subject of this paper. There are vital U.S. interests involved that are best addressed by the regional need for democratic states and fair solutions of conflict problems. The recent rise in international terrorism over the past five years uses the conflict as an excuse - a rallying cry - to fight for Islam. Conversely, recent opportunities provided by the Israeli Gaza Strip disengagement plans and the death of Yassir Arafat in 2004, followed by the successful January 2005 election of new Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, highlight a new chance to address the problems. Negotiated success in the past occurred when concerned nations seized similar opportunities, leading to an opening in discussions between the parties. When America chooses to wield influence as an impartial broker with both sides, progress toward a solution becomes realistic. Five of the greatest problems that must be dealt with in the tenuous final discussions are the right of existence of the States of Israel and Palestine, right of return for Palestinian refugees that fled the wars in 1948 and 1967, status of the city of Jerusalem, settlements in occupied territory and border lines, and water rights. When finally being discussed in search of the final solution, they will likely lead toward a permanent status agreement between Israel and Palestinians. Seemingly insurmountable, they are repeatedly pushed to the future while new layers of complexity make them even more impossible to address. Reflecting on past advances and furthering incremental solutions highlights the importance of constant attention, before the conflict gets any worse.

## UNITED STATES VITAL INTERESTS

The overarching American goals in world conflicts are outlined by President George W. Bush in the National Security Strategy (NSS)<sup>11</sup> published in September 2002:

The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.<sup>2</sup>

American vital interests in the region are more specifically addressed by U.S. policy statements on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict found in the NSS (the exact same wording is repeated in February 2003 as part of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism or NSCT):

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical because of the toll of human suffering, because of America's close relationship with the state of Israel and key Arab states, and because of that region's importance to other global priorities of the United States. There can be no peace for either side without freedom for both sides. America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine, living beside Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. The United States will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict. The United States, the international donor community, and the World Bank stand ready to work with a reformed Palestinian government on economic development, increased humanitarian assistance, and a program to establish, finance, and monitor a truly independent judiciary. If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state.<sup>3</sup>

President Bush continues in both documents to summarize a view on U.S. direct involvement that has played out recently with little success. He states: "The United States can play a crucial role but, ultimately, lasting peace can only come when Israelis and Palestinians resolve the issues and end the conflict between them."<sup>4</sup> When the Bush administration took over in early 2001, it adopted a more isolationist role for U.S. foreign policy. Since then, that U.S. role has failed to be capable of responding as the conflict has escalated and the administration now seems ready to use recent changes in the situation to take a more positive, hands-on role.

At the beginning of 2005 new opportunities find the United States taking a more active approach once again. As in other parts of the world, the U.S. needs to play an active role in formulating solutions to world problems affecting vital U.S. interests, pressing forward in areas where discord converges so sharply with U.S. national interest. Israel interest in security for its people combines with U.S. emphasis on a democratic state for Palestinians to produce a shifting situation in which it is difficult to determine a truly vital US interest. Following a prior history of continued involvement, recent U.S. diplomatic pursuits in the region have been confined to allowing the parties to attempt to solve the problems alone. Following the failures in

the final moments of the Clinton administration's negotiations of Yasser Arafat, advice to the incoming administration was that there was not a creditable partner for negotiation.<sup>5</sup> Although the Bush administration continued some discussions, in January 2002 the capture of weapons on a freighter and proof of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) complicity in their shipment put the final halt at that time to any further proceedings until something basic changed in the situation. By 2005, the new developments provided an opportunity for the U.S. to engage the participants and strongly encourage resumption of an open, transparent process to resolve the conflict and achieve a final settlement.

#### **BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT ISSUES IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN SITUATION**

The lack of a solution to this dispute has effects on the historical Near East and contributes to instability in other regions of the world, with a far-reaching effect on religious stability distant from the actual area. World-wide radical Islamist terrorism uses the establishment of Israel on Muslim land as a slogan, a reason for carrying out terrorist acts against Israel and more recently uses this as an excuse to broaden the terrorist assault to include the U.S., among others. Focusing on resolution of this issue is not to legitimize the actions taken in this pursuit and is not seen as a solution to the problem of increased global terrorism. Nevertheless, it has become more than a minor irritant that needs to be eliminated as a rallying cry.

The Diaspora created by the expulsion of Jews from Israel is indeed a millennia-old problem, considered by some to be impossible to solve; however, the current conflict is separate from that and of more recent creation. Following the Jewish revolt in 70 CE, the Roman Empire, then in full control of the region, expelled the remaining Jews, using a dispersal practice that was a common tactic at that time. The resulting Diaspora spread as far as India and China to the east, Ethiopia in the south, and throughout Europe in the west. Following expulsion from Portugal in the 1700s, Jews arriving in America found a homeland of sorts, free of the persecution known in other nations of the Diaspora, especially in Eastern Europe.

That the Jewish people remained held together by their religion for so long and within so many cultures is their underlying strength, encouraging their hope to return to the land promised by God in the Old Testament. To this end, the rise of the Zionist<sup>6</sup> movement in the late 1800s, influenced by nationalist movements in Europe and the rise of secularization among Jews, led to the movement seeking a new basis for a Jewish national life. Both settlement in the Promised Land and the establishment of a Jewish state there were merged into one movement of emigration to Palestine. Although the land was estimated to be 95% Arab in 1880, a type of

manifest destiny view held that the returning Jews could improve the land, and slogans like “A land without people for a people without land”<sup>7</sup> presented an impression that denied the presence of Arabs. As the Turkish Empire was collapsing in World War I, Great Britain expanded its control of the area when General Sir Edmund H.H. Allenby entered the Old City of Jerusalem in 1917. The British government also issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917, which promised to “look favorably” on a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. In 1920 the League of Nations gave Britain the Palestinian Mandate,<sup>8</sup> in part to implement the Balfour Declaration. British interpretation of the Declaration throughout the 1920s and 1930s came to be limited by growing Arab pressure. The impending gloom of the approaching World War changed the security of European Jewry and eventually led to the partition of Palestine.<sup>9</sup>

The U.S. history of support for nations with free and democratic opportunities for its people has led to U.S. diplomacy in many parts of the world. Indeed, spreading democracy and freedom has become a primary goal for the current administration. U.S. goals in the Middle East combined this with the interest of solving the persecution of European Jews in World War II. With the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, a homeland for the many Jews from the European experience and the Diaspora began. In addition to U.S. government support to Israel, U.S. Jewish philanthropic organizations continue to supply economic and political support to the dream, highlighting the combination of two different influences on one U.S. vital interest.

In 1947, Britain announced its intention to withdraw from Palestine, turning the problem over to the United Nations (see Appendix 1). This led to Resolution 181 (II) of an infant United Nations,<sup>10</sup> which proposed a partitioning of Palestine into a Jewish state and Arab state with Jerusalem becoming an international enclave. On 14 May 1948, the State of Israel was declared, a socialist, secular democratic state born almost two thousand years after the start of the Diaspora (see Appendices 2,3 and 4). The ensuing War of Independence against attacks by the surrounding Arab states brought the world a new nation, the Jewish people finally had a homeland, and the religious Jewish groups returned to their ancient homeland. It was a place to be faithful to their religion without the persecution that had followed them for so many years in the Diaspora.

The war of 1948-49 led a large number of Arabs (estimates vary from 520,000 to 726,000<sup>11</sup>) or be expelled from Israel and settle in refugee camps established by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the region; camps still in existence in 2005. The new ceasefire lines outlined an Israeli nation larger than the UN had proposed and having a majority Jewish population. Following that birth process, Israel drew strength from support by the U.S., regarding the United States as its best and sometimes only

friend in a world still hostile to its dreams. Continued support to this established democracy in the Middle East is a stated vital interest to a United States, which seeks more free democracies in this region.

But the United States is a friend to many and in this troubled region, one where the U.S. has little long-term experience, the U.S. has also become the friend of the Palestinian people that reside in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Planned visits by their elected officials to Washington and the resumption of talks between American and Palestinian authorities are viewed as encouraging by many although derided by the more fundamentalist supporters of Hamas<sup>12</sup> and Islamic Jihad.<sup>13</sup> U.S. democratic principles reach out around the world to many and are often shaped to meet a particular cause. Sometimes only some precepts of these principles are used and others overlooked, however, many Palestinians still feel that the U.S. is the only nation in the world that can help them, the only nation that can influence Israel. This is a curious position for the U.S. in light of the wealth and economic power of the Gulf States and other seemingly supportive Arab voices. The potential focus they could bring to bear economically to positively support a peaceful Palestine, if organized, outweighs a U.S. response to the Palestinian plight. Gulf Arab economic strength supporting development and growth in the Palestinian state can have outcomes comparable to the gains from outside funding provided to build the Israeli nation.

Since the turmoil of the independence struggle, Israel has concentrated on becoming a viable state with a strong military to ensure its freedom in face of continued aggression on all of its borders. Strong governmental institutions and significant U.S. government and private aid, plus a combination of hard work and intense capital investment from the remaining people of the Diaspora, led to successful economic development. Immigration and absorption of all the world's Jews became an Israeli goal. With a homeland guaranteed, the new nation needed workers to share its future. This growth led to the spread of settlements into the areas conquered in 1967 when Israel captured the remaining parts of the original territory set aside by the UN in 1947 for the State of Palestine and additional territory from Syria and Egypt.

The 1967 War, building on almost three decades of unsettled issues, brought new issues to the conflict. After success in defeating the combined military forces of Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, Israel retained military control of the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, and the West Bank as part of a protective barrier from the nations sworn to defeat the Israeli nation and drive out the Jews (see Attachment 5). Eretz Israel<sup>14</sup> had been partially recaptured; the outline of the modern Jewish state was beginning to mirror the biblical land. There is military wisdom to this barrier strategy and the three main occupied areas have had different solutions

in the ensuing thirty five years. The Golan Heights remains in Israeli hands and sporadic talks with two different regimes in Damascus have failed to arrive at a solution. This unresolved condition is one source of support for Hezbollah, the Syrian-backed terrorist organization. The Golan Heights is not densely populated, but it is an elevated escarpment overlooking the Sea of Galilee from which Syria regularly attacked the Israeli city of Tiberias. The Golan is also one of the sources of the Jordan River. These factors combine to give the area greater strategic value beyond its agricultural purpose.

The Sinai was retained until the Camp David Peace Treaty was signed in 1979 declaring peace between Israel and Egypt. UN peacekeepers were put in place observing the border, Israeli military bases relocated into Israel with U.S. funding, and settlements were abandoned.

The final two areas captured in 1967, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, remain as the substantial roadblock to final settlement negotiations and eventual peace in the region. Jerusalem was declared as the Israeli capital, incorporating the Old City of Jerusalem and East Jerusalem, which were also part of the West Bank captured in 1967. Although not recognized by the international community, Israeli retention of Jerusalem as part of Israel is important in the final settlement negotiations.

However, before negotiations on return of those lands began, Security Council Resolution 242 was passed in 1967.<sup>15</sup> Widely called the “land for peace” formula, it calls for the establishment of a just and lasting peace based on territorial withdrawal and in return an end to all hostility, respect for sovereignty, and the right for Israel to live in peace.<sup>16</sup> Although addressing directly the problems rising from the 1967 War, the resolution also addressed conditions unresolved since Israeli Independence. By doing so, the resolution ushered in a new mindset, establishing a new structure for peace and a continued structure for friction. According to a history of the conflict found at MidEastWeb.org:

The Israeli government originally declared that it was ready to return all of the territories except Jerusalem in return for peace treaties with its Arab neighbors. However, religious and nationalist groups began agitating for annexation and settlement of areas in the West Bank and Golan Heights. In the summer of 1967, Moshe Dayan, who was in charge of administering the West Bank, turned down a petition by West Bank notables for self-rule. By July 1967, Yigal Alon had submitted his “Alon Plan” which called for Israeli retention of large parts of the West Bank in any peace settlement for strategic reasons.<sup>17</sup>

This foreshadows the religious drive for a restoration of Eretz Israel and provides the context for solutions to settlements and the Old City. Jewish population growth from the former Soviet Union in the past decade was encouraged by a need for workers that were not threatening as Israel believed their regional neighbors in the occupied territories. This increased immigration

led to a tremendous growth of settlements in all regions, estimated at over 200,000 in many of the recent discussions about the Gaza disengagement plan.

In late 1969 U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers made a proposal in the name of the Nixon administration. By calling for multi-party talks between the four powers – U.S., United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union – to support UN representative Gunnar Jarring's findings toward settlement according to UN Security Council Resolution 242, the U.S. emphasized its responsibility in playing a direct role in solving the problems. Secretary Rogers also called for bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union, necessary as they were the prime backer to the Arab states, a Cold War aspect to this crisis.<sup>18</sup> Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir rejected the plan as too one-sided against Israel.

Egypt and Israel continued sporadic fighting across the Suez Canal in 1969-1970, and in 1973 the region erupted in the October War (also known as the Yom Kippur or Ramadan War). This war took longer for Israel to win, doing so with substantial logistical support from the U.S. Continuing U.S. direct involvement through the Nixon and Ford administrations, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger used what came to be called "shuttle" diplomacy to promote a truce between the warring sides and restore diplomatic relations in the region. Meanwhile, the long Lebanese civil war was beginning after King Hussein of Jordan expelled the *fedayeen* guerilla forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), formed in 1964, forcing them to relocate in Lebanon in 1970. The Palestinians in the West Bank had increasingly identified with the PLO instead of their pre-1967 rulers in Jordan. The Hashemite kingdom retains a significant population of Palestinians to this day, citizens both historically and due to refugee situations following the 1948 and 1967 Wars. Jordan remains composed of self identifying Jordanians, transient Bedouins, and self-identifying Palestinians, creating a sensitive balance politically for the rule of the monarchy. In 1974 the Rabat Summit Conference of Arab leaders formally acknowledged the right of Palestinians to a homeland and as far as the attendees were concerned, gave recognition to PLO claims in the West Bank and put the Palestinian people's future in PLO hands. King Hussein's agreement to the goals of the summit was viewed by the PLO and most of the Arab world as a renunciation of Jordanian claims on the West Bank.<sup>19</sup> Finally, in 1974 the UN recognized PLO representation of the Palestinian people.<sup>20</sup>

In 1978, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made a historic visit to Jerusalem, leading to a new opportunity once again for direct U.S. involvement. Seizing this opening, the United States negotiated the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt leading to the Peace Treaty signing in 1979, which in turn led to the return of the Sinai to Egypt in 1982 and with it the eventual dismantling of the military bases and settlements there. Peace between these two

countries was the easiest to achieve, in part because the common border – the Sinai – was not part of Eretz Israel and was seen by many Israelis as relatively inhospitable desert. There were no greater goals involved than a secure border and cessation of any cross-border attacks. Additionally Egypt was increasingly turning its attention to its growing domestic problems and backed away from any aggression against Israel. In 2005 UN peacekeepers still monitor the Sinai borders.

The Camp David Accords also saw the beginning of a system of considerable support payments from the U.S. to the Israeli and Egyptian governments, with Jordan following at a much lesser rate after signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Approximately 2% of Israel Gross Domestic Product is from these payments,<sup>21</sup> which ensures that Israel has resources to provide for a secure defense and its neighbors have resources to support their own defense, but not offense. Future payments of this nature in the Middle East may extend to Palestine and Syria for stabilization.

U.S. active engagement made progress even as the significant final settlement problems were continuously being pushed into the future by each new step in the process toward peace. However, local politics was beyond U.S. reach yet not immune from impact by these larger issues. Islamic fundamentalist militancy grew in Egypt, causing the military to take more authoritarian actions to reinforce the military/secular government. While the Accords were successful in achieving peace in the long term, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated by an Islamist member of the Egyptian military in 1981. In Israel the return of the settlements in Sinai caused a collapse of the government and led to new resolve by the settler movement to continue to lay claim to greater Eretz Israel.

Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 to prevent further cross-border attacks by the PLO located there since their 1970 expulsion from Jordan, and Syria and Iran funneled money into the Hezbollah organization in Lebanon as Damascus sought to end this occupation. The Israeli Army led by General Ariel Sharon drove out the PLO and Yasser Arafat fled to Tunisia. Israel withdrew to a buffer zone in southern Lebanon, finally withdrawing altogether in 2000. Throughout this occupation, resistance to the occupying Israeli forces grew, strengthening Hezbollah and destabilizing Lebanon.<sup>22</sup> U.S. involvement in the resulting civil war culminated in the 1983 terrorist attack on the Marine headquarters in Beirut. Following that incident, the U.S. reduced its diplomacy in the region with no interaction until the opportunity arose to prevail on both sides to end the first Intifada.

The political situation in the West Bank and Israel continued to deteriorate. In 1987 a partially spontaneous phenomenon now known as the first Intifada<sup>23</sup> was launched by the

Palestinian people. The PLO attempted to claim it had organized this Intifada, competing for the first time with radical Islamic organizations - Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad – that had historically carried out violent killings of civilians seemingly separate of any central organization. With the Intifada continuing until 1993 by some accounts, the new actors differed from the PLO by injecting religious fervor into the terrorism (the PLO goals are largely secular). Yasser Arafat's control on the situation was limited and deteriorating, as he was forced to operate from Tunisia and faced U.S. preconditions to any further negotiations. In late 1988 he formally declared support for UN Resolution 242, promised recognition of Israel, and renounced terrorism. These assurances met U.S. conditions and contributed to the resumptions of talks in 1991.

The dramatic victory of the U.S. forces in the first Gulf War aligned with Soviet attempts to maintain a presence in the rapidly enlarging post-Cold War era. These newfound alliances led to the convening of the Madrid Summit Conference in 1991. The world powers were again directly involved in addressing the increasing violence between Arabs and Israelis, laying the foundations for ongoing negotiations designed to bring peace and economic development to the region. This active engagement led to the signing of a "Declaration of Principles," the Oslo Accords, in September 1993. Now considered flawed by many, the Oslo Accords planned a phased turnover, in stages, of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority (PA) led by Yasser Arafat, newly returned from exile in Tunisia. The two sides also agreed to recognition of the other.

Not all factions agreed to the Oslo Principles. Direct nation-on-nation wars in 1948, 1967 and 1973 were followed by a different tactic – escalation of terrorism. By striking out at all Israelis as occupiers in the holy land, where they live in Israel and abroad, terrorists sought to bring about the eventual defeat of the Israeli state. This method also served well in keeping the political issues of the Palestinian people, as expressed by the PLO leadership, visible in the eyes of the world. Terrorist strategists predicted Israel could be defeated by instilling fear in residents, causing them to flee, while at the same time raising awareness in the world of the dire plight of oppressed Palestinians. What began as car and package bombs in the 1980s led to suicide bombers on busses and at public facilities in the 1990s, re-invasion by the Israel Defense Forces of PA areas in the West Bank, and targeted killings of the leaders of various terrorist factions. Although it was widely believed that Yasser Arafat controlled every move of his people, a rapidly failing state was becoming more the reality. Meanwhile Israeli hardliners had co-opted the settler movement that had been building on occupied land since the 1967 war. With the support of the government, increased construction of substantial settlement towns and

cities began ringing Jerusalem and penetrating deep into the West Bank. In 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, a strong supporter of the Peace Process throughout, was assassinated by a right-wing Jewish radical. Rabin's support for the Oslo Accords and final solution to the problems ended his life.

Despite the ever present threat of terrorist bombings in Israel, the 1990s were relatively peaceful as the Oslo Accords were being implemented – and not implemented – agonizingly slowly. Violence levels were predictable if specific targets were not, making daily life in Israel increasingly hazardous. Toward the second term of the Clinton presidency further progress was attempted with the 1998 Wye Plantation Memorandum involving the now conservative Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from the Likud Party. Neither side made real progress on this new restatement of the Oslo goals and adjustments to its peace process schedules; this led to yet another summit at Sharm el-Sheikh in 1999. The memorandum from this summit reiterated previous goals but once again was met with general disinterest. The final push by the Clinton Administration was a summit in Taba, Egypt a year later and the July 2000 Clinton-Arafat-Barak meetings at Camp David. Serious proposals on future borders including realignment of some pre-1967 territory as well as refugee compensation were reportedly on the table. However, no specific agreement came from this effort although the terms discussed are still being furthered by the present administration with varied effect. Effective diplomacy failed as the U.S. increasingly realized that it did not have an honest broker in Yasser Arafat, no matter how much they seemed to want to have him as one.

Turmoil surrounded these negotiations; leaked proposals were very unpopular on both sides of the issue and emphasized how difficult final negotiations will be. The Clinton presidency ended in January 2001 and the Israeli government led by Ehud Barak, facing an election and weakened by the peace process, saw the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000. His defeat by Ariel Sharon and the ushering in again of a right-wing government led by the Likud Party presents the framework for current options.

#### **UNITED STATES ATTEMPTS AT DIPLOMACY SINCE THE START OF THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA**

With the realization that the al-Aqsa Intifada was spinning out of control and negotiations were not at any point near approval of any proposals, new directions were needed unilaterally to face the problems. One of the final acts by the Clinton administration was the appointment of retired Senator George J. Mitchell in 2000 to chair a multinational investigatory committee set up to look into the causes of the latest threat to peace. Beginning in September 2000 during an Israeli election, the second Intifada is linked with the visit by candidate Ariel Sharon to the

Temple Mount, accompanied by over 1000 security personnel.<sup>24</sup> The Mitchell Report was completed in early May 2001 and presented to the new administration of President George W. Bush, five months before the U.S. focus would shift to the tragedy of the 11 September strike on New York and Washington. Beside repeatedly calling for an immediate end to the escalating violence, in several places the Mitchell Report calls for the resumption of security cooperation and a return to negotiations: "We reiterate our belief that a 100 percent effort to stop the violence, an immediate resumption of security cooperation and an exchange of confidence building measures are all important for the resumption of negotiations. Yet none of these steps will long be sustained absent a return to serious negotiations."<sup>25</sup> There were no discussions between the two sides at this time and short-term and long-term negotiations did not seem possible without outside intervention. Even if perceived at times as a futile effort, the report set down some milestones in an attempt to prompt some talks between the major players.

Despite this effort the al-Aqsa Intifada was increasingly escalating out of hand, and the new administration called for a ceasefire in the region. Proposed by CIA director George Tenet, it took effect on 13 June 2001. Referencing resolutions leading up to the Mitchell Report and the report itself, the proposed ceasefire laid out a plan of steps to bring about a resolution of the conflict and attempted to return to the status quo in Israel and the West Bank prior to September 2000.<sup>26</sup> Due to the unwillingness or inability of Chairman Arafat to control actions of various militant groups in the Palestinian areas and unwillingness of the Israelis to enter any discussions, let alone negotiations, without total cessation of violence, the ceasefire did not last and ultimately was a failure. In spite of this, the Tenet discussions had kept the U.S. engaged and provided some obtainable proposals, however conditional, that could lead to improvement of the situation; however, the U.S. agreed with Israel that there was no partner for peace in the person of Yasser Arafat.

Although reportedly informed by the Clinton State Department, perhaps by others, that there was no way to trust any promises coming from President Arafat, that knowledge alone did not lead to the administration of President George W. Bush to take a disengagement approach in dealing with the Middle East. This administration came to office determined to take a more hands-off approach in other world issues, too, and step back from the international scene to allow local powers to solve their own problems without direct American intervention. Following the failure of the Tenet ceasefire, the U.S. decided to continue economic support for its interests in the region, but leave others to assist the sides to negotiate their own solutions.

Aggression continued on a tit-for-tat level, the technology used becoming more lethal and the barriers to restraint in warfare lowered. No opportunity for peace was apparent, but U.S

diplomacy turned to the UN in early 2002 to propose adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1397. The resolution stated that the Security Council was, "Welcoming and encouraging the diplomatic efforts of special envoys from the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United Nations Special Coordinator and others, to bring about a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East."<sup>27</sup> With establishment of the Quartet the U.S. brought together a collaborative diplomatic and economic focus to the problem and attempted to force movement toward a solution. Follow-up resolutions were necessary almost immediately with passage of resolutions 1402 and 1403 repeating the call for cessation of the violence,<sup>28</sup> as the situation continued to deteriorate further. The resulting plan from the Quartet findings, now known as the Roadmap for Peace,<sup>29</sup> was issued a year later on 30 April 2003. Its graduated steps, when carried out, would lead the two sides toward peace: "The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005 ..."<sup>30</sup> Focused mostly on the restoration of security in the region, and once again ignoring final solution issues, the Roadmap does nothing to improve human rights and democracy in the conflict and provides little incentive to either side if they follow it. It fails to address the basic problems of mistrust with any probable solution to the fact that Israel will not negotiate with the elected head of the Palestinian Authority and the PA refuses to control its security forces and end rampant corruption that has taken over the plight of the Palestinian people. Now, in 2005, these two problems can be seen in a new light as some basic changes in the political scene may lead to new opportunities.

Although the Roadmap lays out incremental steps to reach a point of peaceful coexistence between two nations – Israel and Palestine – living side by side, mutually respecting each other's right to exist and no longer presenting any threat to each other, it is the two nation goal that has breathed new life into the discussions. There is also an implication that there will be regional partners supporting, and by extension prospering, from this new regional peace begun by the final settlement of the conflict. This goal is worthwhile and indeed a critical end-state for a safe and secure region. Due to the failure of either side to comply with any of the initial Roadmap demands, the dated schedule in the plan is now hopelessly passed. Both sides have continued to place demands on each other, the Israelis calling for immediate cessation to terror attacks and the Palestinians calling for an end to occupation as a precursor to ending those same terror attacks. This is a circular argument, and quite an old one in this part of the world, that leads nowhere and will not be changed without pressure from outside powers seizing the openings from recent events. Neither side is willing to compromise no matter how painful the current situation seems to the outside observer.

The structure of the Roadmap is still on the table and continues to be referenced as the starting point. The U.S. has a strong opportunity to forward the cause of negotiated settlement now that the late President Arafat has been replaced by President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Sharon has proposed a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The U.S. needs to maintain focus on the long-term solution and establish a permanent, transparent apparatus to discuss the problems and entertain solutions from all quarters. It is obvious that there is no simple one solution; if so, it would have been enacted long ago. Almost each successful phase in the solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict so far have an American component; the U.S. needs to find a way forward by examining the vital interests of both Israel and Palestine. U.S. policies cite establishment of democratic governments as one of our vital interests throughout the world, the diplomatic establishment of a Palestinian democracy in a viable state included.

#### **RECENT CHANGES ON THE PATH TO A TWO-STATE SOLUTION**

There are deep underlying problems that keep the sides divided and inspire the brutal actions that continue the turmoil. At times in the recent past the U.S. seems to have been dragged down by the confusion of issues that occurs in this conflict, succumbing to the spin. The U.S. has a vital interest in arriving at the two nation end-state and can uniquely assist in bringing this about by utilizing our regional perspective as well as our status as world leader in the region. The parameters of fair play and honorable brokers are nowhere more confused than in this part of the Middle East, where even allies at times withhold information and are slow to reveal their true motives.

Yet the U.S. has a great opportunity to again attempt solution due to two significant new occurrences that have opened new avenues for progress. From the Israeli perspective, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's controversial, unilateral proposal in April 2004 to pull out of Gaza and parts of the West Bank is accompanied with problems (unilateral approach) and strings (statements that other settlements will never be moved). But coupled with Sharon's agreement to President Bush's call for an independent, viable Palestinian state, this response still represents a major shift in attitude (possibly). While the proposal is proceeding toward implementation, various parties maintain that the Gaza pullout will not happen and that it is political suicide for Sharon personally (and maybe real suicide as well), but it has at least put some difficult final status issues back on the negotiation agenda.

The other major change has come with the death of Yasser Arafat, prompting new Palestinian Authority leadership to focus on achieving the now commonly accepted goal of building a viable state and implementing actions to stop the violence. President Mahmoud

Abbas, a long-time PLO lieutenant to Arafat who is nonetheless considered legitimate by both sides, was free and fairly elected in January 2005. The PLO-PA has again declared violence counterproductive to achieving the independent state so much wanted by the Palestinians. For a true peace, the underlying problems must be addressed through honest negotiations, not through the military solutions of overwhelming might and suicide bombings, no matter how destabilizing the process leading to that negotiated solution is going to seem. As these changes continue to affect the daily situation, the U.S. instruments of government need to stay directly involved, smoothing out the inevitable problems that will continue to occur and focused on final goals. As exemplified by the President's call for an independent Palestine, his word greatly affects the situation. International encouragement that there will be support for final solutions combined with the economic tools to create viable, peaceful states need to be background to new proposals. Additionally, consideration of all proposed solutions need to be addressed in the transparency of open negotiations, not rejected out of hand as has frequently been the case. The U.S. needs to assure that concentration on bringing transparency and vision, while trying to continue to pursue the "fair broker" reputation that has been tarnished of late. Eventually the process will reach a crucial stage when the parties concerned conclude that the benefits of peace outweigh the gains of further conflict. Then, the door to negotiation will open wider.

The U.S. interest in the region has also shifted, recently becoming more active due to events occurring in Israel-Palestine as well as in neighboring Lebanon and Syria and the efforts to create a new democracy in Iraq. Calls for transition to democracies in the troubled nations of the region are heard frequently from administration spokesmen. To be proactive in this stalemate the diplomatic approach will be enhanced by appointing a single U.S. envoy responsible for coordinating and balancing U.S. efforts in this conflict. The effect will be to provide a clear message necessary to lead the two parties toward final talks and solutions.

#### **FIVE MAJOR PROBLEMS**

aaaarrghh, we have struck a mighty blow to the zionists. now they will realize that they are inf idels and will withdraw all of their forces from our land. they will not retaliate or call off the withdrawl or the release of prisioners because we will not let them. only by continuing this war will we have peace.

- ^ic ^ from Holy Land

nothing unexpected in this story. we all knew hamas and the pals. would break the peace agreement sooner or later. this show the world once and for all that hamas will put on the peace act to appease the liberals, and then boom. surprise. america should let israel loose to do whatever they want, the pals deserve it.

- We Who Watch from IN The World

it wasnt a terroristt attack it was a peace proceess celebration,it was done by the zionistt n the blame will go to the palestines

- sharon from usa

These are three unedited comments followed an initial Al Jazeera web article on the Tel Aviv bombing posted on 25 February 2005.<sup>31</sup> Such comments coming after the election of Mahmoud Abbas as President and after years of intransigence on these issues come as no surprise but reflect the reality that there is still a long way to go in the process. They highlight the extreme opinions in the street, albeit a virtual street in this case. The rhetoric from spokesmen and politicians on both sides in the past seemed at times to be no less harsh by echoing the radical voices frequently allowed to be the spokesmen, overpowering any moderate opinions. The largest problems to overcome in the region are the mistrust that the sides have for each other, mistrust within each side for other factions, and misinformation spread throughout the world about the current situation. Recently the U.S. has been more and more perceived in the international community as an unequal player due to its apparent agreement with some Israeli proposals and tactics. The current negative level with which the U.S. is perceived may only be fleeting in the continuum of the problems in this region, but U.S. attention to the negotiation of the major problems at this opportune time will assist overcoming this perception while crafting a lasting peace in the region acceptable to both major parties and to the U.S. as well. Even when the U.S. is perceived by one side as providing total support for Israel, equality for both sides on many issues can be found when going beyond the spin. However, administration statements are vague at times, supporting only the confusion. Critics use as examples the U.S. refusal to enter into any type of discussion with the Palestinian Authority as long as Yasser Arafat remained chairman, which was seen by the larger region as an example of American arrogance. With no proposals to bring negotiations out of an impasse, the sides will continue the struggle. Israel will continue to attempt to impose a harsh military solution as a threat in order to provide a secure environment for its citizens. Terrorist organizations attempt to show their success as "progress for the Palestinian plight" by almost competing in efforts to kill more Israelis, attacking where Israelis feel most comfortable and safe. Moderate Israelis were surprised and appalled by the idea that the unpredictable violence and

fear from the first Intifada had returned with the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, and the unstable situation had rapidly become the norm for their daily existence. The reprisals felt by the Palestinian people against the families of suspected terrorists, the home demolitions, olive tree uprooting, and collateral damage from targeted missile attacks on vehicles also began to take their toll in that community. This reality caused no movement to further the expectations for a permanent solution coming from either side.

Without detailing the current proposed solutions by the many observers of the region, the major problems providing the largest areas of disagreement between the two sides can be summed up as follows, in no particular priority:

- Right of existence of the State of Israel and the State of Palestine
- Repatriation of displaced Palestinians from the 1948 War of Independence, 1967 Six Day War, and smaller conflicts
- The Old City of Jerusalem and the City of Jerusalem as capital of either state or both.
- Settlements and the delineation of the final borders with Palestine an economically viable state
- Water rights from the Jordan River and other sources

These issues have been discussed and negotiated through the years, yet they still remain open and in need of solution before establishing Palestine as a viable entity. Final talks should begin where they previously left off and a long-term view taken addressing these issues.

#### **RIGHT OF EXISTENCE OF BOTH STATES**

Israel and the PLO have previously stated they recognize the right for each other to exist, yet the main terrorist groups do not agree to this premise. Hamas and Hezbollah are sworn to the destruction of the Jewish state; therefore this is effectively still an issue in the West Bank and Gaza. Jewish extremist groups state that Eretz Israel has been given to them by God to do with as destined. Existence is usually assured by military strength backing civilian authority. Both nations need to make it clear that with the establishment of the Palestinian state, all previous challenges to the right for Israel to exist are no longer accepted. The international community also has a part in this by limiting support to groups in opposition to these rights, easing travel restrictions, lifting economic blockades, and establishing diplomatic relations with both states. Final settlement must enshrine the right of Israel and Palestine to exist alongside peaceful regional partners with all the freedoms that are accorded sovereign nations.

Violence is the current manifestation of the mistrust that these two peoples have toward each other and is used to threaten the existence of each other's state. The terrorist bombings are used to threaten the Israeli population and attempt to force them to leave while the settlement policies reach into Palestinian land and threaten its existence as a viable state,

contributing to radical incitement against Israeli citizens. If the violence stopped now, there would still not be much trust between the two sides and the beliefs on the right to exist would remain unchanged. The right to exist of both sides does not have a public forum in either sides media, at least not at a constant level. A change to this may begin to desensitize the issues surrounding the establishment and acceptance of the two independent states. Final negotiations must leave the region with a strong framework supporting existence for the two states working alongside each other, with both contributing to regional institutions that are capable of addressing problems without resorting to violence.

#### **REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED PALESTINIANS**

This is one of the most important issues to the Palestinian people and a major roadblock for Israelis of all persuasion as it directly threatens the existence of the Jewish state. Beyond a desire of many moderate Palestinians to raise a family and work for a decent living, they feel a strong emotional pull for their family members, friends, and neighbors that long ago fled the violence to the surrounding countries. There is the need to form a plan among the regional partners to deal with closing of the refugee camps by resettling residents and how the repatriation issue can contribute to this goal. The numbers involved disturb Israel, as well as the notion of integrating people that it perceives as hostile to the State of Israel. If all refugees with land claims in Israel were to return there, the Jewish state would no longer be that, having been overcome by Muslim Arabs, eliminating a major reason for Israel's being. Denying these newcomers influence in the political direction of the Israeli nation would undermine the notion of a democratic state, a condition that Israel also does not want.

The scope of the situation can be summed up by information from the MidEastWeb.org for Coexistence in a report stating:

The war that ensued [Independence] was won by Israel, creating a large number of Arab refugees. Estimates vary from about 520,000 (Israeli sources) to 726,000 (UN sources) to over 800,000 (Arab sources) refugees, Palestinian Arabs who fled or were forced out of their homes during the fighting. This number has grown to include over 4.6 million displaced persons, about 3.7 million of whom are currently registered as refugees with the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees). Of these, somewhat over a million live in camps run by the UNRWA.<sup>32</sup>

It is a formidable problem to deal with and has many complex aspects. Since Israel sees these refugees as hostile persons it has passed laws assigning their property to a separate custodian. Most recent discussions focus on some type of compensation in return for seized property, but whether or not this is feasible or fundable remains to be seen. Relocation to nations other than

Israel is also discussed. Israel may let a small amount return, but in a situation that it shares with the proposed Palestine of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel cannot afford to have a large influx due to population density and economic reasons. Differentiation needs to be made between monetary compensation for land lost and where refugees relocate. Money can be offered in return for surrender of claims on property previously owned, but residency after that is a separate issue.

The countries with refugee camps (see Appendix 6) may accept some as citizens although only Jordan has offered that opportunity to all residents in its camps. Resettlement in North America and Europe may be another option considered, although this curiously looks like another Diaspora. The problem grows with each year as the numbers increase, with a third generation now living in some camps. Another outcome of chronically impoverished residents living in refugee camps is influence by radical movements which help to create a terrorist breeding ground for the bombers and bomb-making factories that inflict horror on the citizens of Israel. The camps are “failed states” in their own right, with a constant message that the impoverishment is the fault of Israel and only the radical organizations can better the predicament of the residents (or at least strike those responsible for their misery).

Additional issues are the Israeli view that the Palestinian refugee issue ties in to the expulsion of Jews from Arab lands following the War of Independence and the lack of support in international law for any compensation for former residents presently felt by a government to really be the enemy. The nations with refugee camps see this problem as an Israeli one to solve, as they see Israel as the cause of the flight. The 2003 Geneva Accord (Beilin-Abd-Rabbo Document)<sup>33</sup> calls for Palestinians to give up right of return of Palestinian refugees, a step in the right direction that is balanced by concessions on other issues. This plan was rejected immediately by Israel, yet remains on the table as a talking point for future discussion. New ideas are needed as the resettlement problem will never be solved by the two main parties acting on their own beyond the current solution. Concurrently, the barrier/fence and international boundaries on one side create an Israeli island, which terrorist tactics on the other side attempt to make uninhabitable.

#### **STATUS OF JERUSALEM**

There are two critical parts to this problem, one religious and one secular. They are intertwined and almost need be treated as one grander problem whose resolutions might benefit all.

There are many holy sites in the area sacred to the three religions “of the book,” some holy for all three. These sites become reasons for some religious activists on both sides to claim ownership of the entire regional area. In the modern globalized world, freedom of movement is important and extends beyond commerce in this region as access to sacred sites for each religion. This goal may only come about in degrees due to the immense distrust that will need to be reduced in the coming decades. Israel currently controls most of the major sites and generally has allowed access for all, not only Jews. Arab Muslims, however, see it differently, especially when Israel restricts access to the holy mosques on the al-Haram al-Sharif, or Temple Mount, when threatened. The current Israeli accommodations, while not perfect due to fluctuating criteria in response to threat conditions, seem to afford the possibility for all to visit and worship as they please. This is an area where the extreme voices are drowning out the moderate.

Throughout Israel and the West Bank there are historic and religious sites that will need to be accessible to people of different religions and accessibility to all may elude the governments in charge on this issue. Most countries restrict visitors it feels to be threatening in some way. Actual ownership of a site can also be an issue, however recent repair work on the Al Aqsa complex by a Jordanian engineering firm that was mutually acceptable to both the Government of Israel and the Waqf controlling the Temple Mount/al Aqsa complex points to a spirit of compromise that rarely exists on these sites. Even the Christian communities disagree on work at the Church of the Holy Sepulcher.

With Jerusalem the site of the main holy places, its coincidence with being the preferred capital of two nations complicates the issues greatly. There are worldwide precedents for shared use of an area for the purpose of authority and while these may not fit the exact needs of either nation, they may hold some possibilities for concessions. Some examples are the U.S. Indian Reservations existing as quasi-sovereign states within the U.S., the Vatican City within Rome, even large corporate headquarters within an office building probably administering an “empire” valued far in excess of many small nations. The notion of Jerusalem or the Old City as an internationally administered open city has been discussed; it was on the table in the original 1947 UN Resolution 181 (II) declaration. Other ideas call for all of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, or the partition of East Jerusalem, the former Jordanian side of town, without the Old City as the capital of Palestine. Some hold for a complete return to 1967 borders. The Old City has religious significance to the world, and economic significance to the inhabitants, but no strategic importance to either. West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine in an open city configuration would be desirable, but the barrier fence complicates

the issue by currently dividing the neighborhoods and establishing entry points completely out of the norm with daily existence up to this time. However, if indeed there is no aggression between the two states, it may be possible to revert to an invisible border between the two areas. The Old City itself should be under an international administration with a strong security component to prevent harm to the observant faithful of all three religions. These are very hard issues that need to be addressed.

Further complications are the effect of the ring of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem now surrounding much of Jerusalem, making it arguably a city within Israel, where once the East Jerusalem sector was easily connected to the rest of the West Bank. The route of the new barrier/fence and the construction method itself have caused deep resentment and changed the nature of contiguous areas that used to be one community. The latest route of the fence will bring Rachel's Tomb on the Bethlehem side of its border with Jerusalem into Israel. As this site is holy to all three religions, this will cause more problems for final negotiation. In the past several decades there was not much mention of religion as a basis for any of the agreement or problems. More recently, however, its importance has grown with the rise of the Ultra-Orthodox in Israel and the Hamas and other radical fundamentalist groups among the Palestinians.

### **SETTLEMENTS AND BOUNDARIES - ALTERNATE VIEWS OF A MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST**

This is a land in conflict, held dear by many for the relatively intangible belief in its religious value. More than normal territory seized for its fertility or minerals, this part of the Middle East is the founding site for two of the three major world "religions of the books." The Jewish faith holds that God gave this land to the Jewish people, Christians revere it as the birthplace of Christ, and Islam holds that the Dome of the Rock covers the site of Mohammad's ascendancy to heaven in the night dream. There are more holy sites throughout the land.

There is an Arab concept of one state in the region, one land from the Mediterranean to the Jordan Valley, from Lebanon to Egypt and perhaps beyond to include Jordan, although there is no movement towards that at this moment. The Palestinian dreams in the past officially held by the PLO, now remaining in Hamas and Hezbollah statements, would lead to expulsion of all Jews from Israel (the push-them-into-the-sea argument). Whether using the religious arguments for this extreme as put forward by radical Islamic groups or the secular nationalist argument for a homeland, this expulsion does not appear likely. The borders defining this enlarged Palestinian state are similar to the stated goals of another group, the hard-line religious Jews who believe in Eretz Israel. Their belief, from the Old Testament, is that the

entire territory was given by God to the Jewish people ("from Dan even to Be'er Sheva"<sup>34</sup>) as their promised land, and while not necessarily calling for the direct expulsion of the residents (Arab Muslims and Christians, Druze, etc.), the groups behind the settler movement do stand firm on ownership of the land and the freedom to do what they want with it. There are, however, no distinct, agreed-upon borders for this group, making the problem even more vague.

Far beyond the arguments of both sides is the reality that the greater world community will not allow either enlarged state to happen, at least not in the way that the extremists have described. Demographics and influence on the numbers from both immigration and birth rates is very important in this part of the Middle East. Lebanon has moved from a predominantly Maronite Christian country in the 1940s to a predominantly Shia Muslim country today. The friction that comes with those changes is compounded by any mistrust already found between groups and often results in tragic situations. The main reason why the enlarged state of Palestine will never be can be stated simply. The demographics, even absent the hostility, would produce a predominantly Muslim nation and therefore defeat the dream of the early Zionists for a Jewish state of their own. As partially explained in the refugee section, if Israel absorbed the West Bank tomorrow and created the larger Israeli nation, the voting numbers would overwhelm the Jewish vote and lead to chaos and the eventual loss of the homeland as a Jewish state. Two other potential options for this state would lead to the loss of the democratic part of the Israeli nation: Israel could declare that the new West Bank residents could not vote or Israel could force the exit of all non-Israelis from the West Bank.

Finally there are the problems with the physical land boundaries, land as normal sovereign territory for citizens to use. The Israeli government is currently constructing a temporary security fence and wall system to prevent terrorist infiltration. The route of the fence is inside the former 1967 "Green Line" border and in many places it is located well within the West Bank. It also penetrates deeply into the area to enclose settlements illegally constructed on occupied territory (see Appendix 7), settlements whose very existence are the biggest bone of contention to Palestinians. The new barrier separates farmers from their land and in some places divides villages. As it is currently being built through the suburbs of Jerusalem, the barrier is destroying communities and neighborhoods that have been connected since their establishment decades ago. Had the route followed the "Green Line," reasons for complaints would be fewer, as this is a long established border delineating the two sides. The temporary nature of the divide seems to please few, arguments on the right hold the fence as giving validity to a divided greater Israel and Palestinians see it as a delineation of a yet again smaller Palestine, far less viable as the barrier encloses more illegal settlements. It is ironic that final

settlement talks now include the open flow between two countries, similar to the borders in the European Union now, as a goal where it once existed.

### **WATER RIGHTS**

Israel's water supply is stored in three main sources which together comprise the National Water System: Sea of Galilee, the Coastal Aquifer, and the Mountain (Yarkon-Taninim) Aquifer. These sources can basically provide about as much water as Israel needs to use when replenished through annual rainfall. However, population has risen sharply with Russian immigration since latest capacity and need studies. The problem that impacts the final settlement talks is the possession of the aquifer located under what will be the Palestinian state and the willingness of Israel to provide equal shares of that resource to both governments.<sup>35</sup> In addition, the problem of proportionally sharing water from the River Jordan along the eastern border usually is not mentioned. A valuable commodity in this arid land for irrigated agricultural crop production as well as the significant population density, the Jordan River is largely natural overflow from the Sea of Galilee down to the Dead Sea. The Sea of Galilee is a large, deep freshwater lake, below sea level, that contributes drinking water to the Israeli national grid. In recent drought years the low lake level has emphasized the importance of this source to the region. Irrigation is important to the farmers affected but crops can be grown or purchased from elsewhere depending on the national priority. This may impact the farm economy in the Palestinian state more than the Israeli economy due to the relative sizes of each, but it does directly affect all farmers living on the affected land threatened to be cut off from water. The West Bank settlements greatly complicate the water issue with the patchwork development now in place allowing more water to be drawn for Israeli settler use than the demographics would normally permit. Beyond the difference in usage between the two nationalities, the water issue remains quantifiable and ownership needs to be addressed in the final settlement discussions.

There is also the international aspect of the shared water and shared border with Jordan that needs to be solved. Drought affects the entire eco-system, but politics would be involved when the determination is made in dry years as to how much runoff is allowed and who pumps it from the river and in what quantities: Jordan, Palestine, or Israel. One question is whether the Jordan Valley will remain in Israel hands, similar to the buffer zone between Egypt and Gaza (the Philadelphia corridor). As the Jordan flows south, Israel and Jordan need to have sufficient water present to maintain a level of water in the Dead Sea to allow the leaching process necessary to extract minerals from the industrial area at the southern end. Large export industries in both countries depend on this process and there is no other viable source of water

to drain into the Dead Sea. The Dead Sea is also an unexploited potential revenue source for Palestine. Due to large-scale projects by Israel and Jordan to divert water from the Jordan River for irrigation and other water needs, the surface of the Dead Sea has been dropping for at least the past 50 years.<sup>36</sup>

A final argument centers on the tributaries to the Sea of Galilee. These sources involve Lebanon in the north and the mountainous region in the Golan Heights. The natural flow is across borders but upriver pumping technology is available to the world market and there are many examples of mighty rivers becoming a trickle as they cross a border, similar to the Colorado River in the U.S. as it enters Mexico. The Jordan is not a mighty river, but in an arid land it is all that the area has. Any negotiations must take the political situation into consideration, and a fair broker involvement in the discussion is necessary to deconstruct the arguments and realistically apply scientific criteria to the political wants. Failing to do this will lead to future disputes on use of the most precious, non-renewable commodity in the Mid East, one that life depends on.

Recent construction of the barrier fence/wall and the inclusion of settlements built on occupied lands has added a new question. Water rights with respect to these settlements and their peripheral territory could develop into another bargaining point for final settlement talks. This could possibly allow for a continuation of the imbalance of use of these scarce resources as Israel pumps more water into the national grid and supplies Palestine with less water than it rightfully is entitled to have.

#### **U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLE IN DISCUSSIONS**

Solutions will not occur in the on-going vacuum of discourse that characterizes the recent approach between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. With Mahmoud Abbas' successful formation of a new cabinet added to the Gaza pull-out initiative, there is now hope that discussions will proceed. Indeed, they have begun anew with a realization that Abbas may be the partner that Israel could not find in Yasser Arafat. The constant tit-for-tat response to each new aggression has been set aside, at least for now. Following the February bombing in Tel Aviv, Israel showed restraint by not attacking the PA or halting negotiations. The United States government has an enormous capacity to lead the discussions and enable the face-to-face interactions so necessary to deal with conflict resolution. As the sole remaining superpower the U.S. can better focus issues with the help of regional allies to channel resources to solutions, making the desire for military solutions less an option. Working with existing international organizations and alliances, while establishing and strengthening regional

economic communities, will bring about a larger, diverse group of forums to better approach conflict resolution. The Bush administration needs to evaluate this approach while balancing other issues currently on the table.

The U.S. will also be better situated to shape the outcomes and include the issues that are vital to it when it takes the leadership role. By participating early on and encouraging an initial framework for the agendas that directly deal with the conflict situations, the United States brings its viewpoints directly to the situation. Long-term commitment will be necessary to convince both sides that the U.S. will remain focused on the solution from this point on. Seeking this new commitment by utilizing the latest opportunity for engagement is to U.S. advantage if it means to be a regional partner expanding democracy in this part of the world, with Israel, Palestine, and all their neighbors.

There are many ways that the U.S. can assist the region directly. U.S. economic strength is one of its best advantages, as the U.S. already spends vast sums of money in the region. The U.S. supports most of the region's militaries and can provide technology and infrastructure improvements as partners in the process. Can America's billions of dollars in support throughout the region be augmented and re-focused on solutions? Israel, as the economic and democratic powerhouse of the region, needs to assess similarly. The U.S. also can still assemble economic coalitions with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Union, etc. to assist development and aid for the stability and establishment of Palestine. The U.S. currently works with the UN in Sinai peacekeeping operations. Expansion of this mission may be needed to cover the West Bank and Gaza. Ensuring a peaceful and honest border between Israel and Palestine will go a long way to rebuilding confidence in the regional partners.

#### **CONTROL THE LANGUAGE, CONTROL THE DEBATE**

The underlying strength in the Bush administration approach assumes self-determination as a strong compelling reason for a group to work toward achieving lasting, high-value outcomes. The underlying weaknesses are scale, competency, and motivation. The strengths and size of the two sides in this conflict are too widely separated and the organizational structures and type of powers behind them equally disparate. And they are the same entities involved from the beginning of the conflict that have allowed it to perpetuate itself in many degrees and ways for the past decades. In fact, no progress in this dispute has been solved without substantial outside intervention by concerned parties. Although it seemed the right thing

to do at the time, the Bush administration's earlier hands-off approach allowed for a deeper division of the two sides.

Many assumptions have been made about the on-going conflict. One is that there are simple solutions; another that there are no solutions. Perhaps the conflict is better solved by a military solution, or perhaps a religious solution, with an end result being one of the extremes stated earlier to drive the Israelis into the Mediterranean or the Palestinians back across the Jordan. None of those possibilities holds any promise for a real and lasting solution; they either continue the present impasse or create enormously divisive and contrived situations. The settlement of the crisis will come about, somehow and in some way. Making it happen now will ensure that participants dealing with the situation at this time will have the strongest hand in creating this new future. Past attempts at trying to secure a solution to conflict in the region have only succeeded in small ways. Even those small steps were aided by others, mostly by direct diplomacy from the U.S. There is a management principle in the U.S. that regards the agenda in a business meeting as the basis for controlling the outcome of that meeting. Although the America seeks to control the agenda at final settlement talks while the players negotiate the outcome of their individual vital interests, the U.S. needs to remain engaged, providing reference to the agenda, maintaining the focus.

WORD COUNT=11,671



APPENDIX ONE - CONCISE OVERVIEW OF RECENT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN HISTORY <sup>37</sup>

Nov 2, 1917	British issued the Balfour Declaration, viewed by Jews and Arabs as promising a "National Home" for the Jews in Palestine.
1936-1939	Arab Revolt led by Haj Amin Al-Husseini. Over 5,000 Arabs were killed according to some sources, mostly by British. Several hundred Jews were killed by Arabs. Husseini fled to Iraq and then to Nazi Germany.
May 15, 1948	Israel War of Independence (1948 War). Declaration of Israel as the Jewish State; British leave Palestine; Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia declared war on Israel. Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian invasion began.
April 3, 1949	Armistice - Israel and Arab states agree to armistice. Israel gained about 50% more territory than was originally allotted to it by the UN Partition Plan.
Oct. 29, 1956	Suez Campaign. In retaliation for a series of escalating border raids as well as the closure of the straits of Tiran and Suez canal to Israeli shipping, and to prevent Egyptian use of newly acquired Soviet arms in a war, Israel invades the Sinai peninsula and occupies it for several months, with French and British collaboration.
May, 1964	PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) founded with the aim of destroying Israel. The Palestinian National Charter (1968) officially called for liquidation of Israel.
May, 1967	Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser closes the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and dismisses UN peacekeeping force. Negotiations with US to reopen the Straits of Tiran fail.
June 5-11, 1967	6-day war. Israel destroys the Egyptian air force on the ground, conquers and occupies Sinai and Gaza, then conquers the West Bank from Jordan, and Golan Heights from Syria. UN resolution 242 called for Israeli withdrawal, establishment of peace.
Oct. 6, 1973	Yom Kippur War (October War). In a surprise attack on the Jewish day of atonement, Egypt retook the Suez canal and a narrow zone on the other side. Syria reconquered the Golan Heights. Following massive US and Soviet resupplying of the sides, Israel succeeded in pushing back the Syrians and threatening Damascus. Ariel Sharon crossed the Suez Canal and cut off the Egyptian Third Army.
March 26, 1979	Peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel.
June 7, 1981	Israel destroys Iraqi nuclear reactor in daring raid.
Oct. 6, 1981	Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is assassinated while on the reviewing stand of a victory parade.
June 6, 1982	Massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon to fight PLO.
Sept. 13, 1993	Oslo Declaration of Principles - Israel and PLO agree to mutual recognition.
Sept 28, 1995	Oslo Interim Agreement signed. Palestinian Authority to be established.
Nov. 4, 1995	Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin assassinated by right-wing Israeli fanatic Yigal Amir. Rabin is replaced by Shimon Peres
June, 1996	Right-Wing Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu elected Prime Minister in Israel, replacing Shimon Peres.

Sept, 1996	"Al-Aksa tunnel riots - Arab sources spread the false rumor that a gate opened in an underground tunnel tourist attraction by the Israeli government, endangered the foundations of the Al-Aqsa mosque. This caused several days of rioting and numerous casualties.
Jan 18, 1997	Israel and Palestinians reach agreement on Israeli redeployment in the West-Bank city of Hebron
Oct. 1998	Wye River Plantation talks result in an agreement for Israeli redeployment and release of political prisoners and renewed Palestinian commitment to correct its violations of the Oslo accords including excess police force, illegal arms and incitement in public media and education.
May 17, 1999	Israel elects Labor party leader and Former General Ehud Barak as Prime Minister in a landslide. Barak promises rapid progress toward peace.
March, 2000	Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations fail when Hafez Assad rejects an Israeli offer relayed by US President Clinton in Geneva.
Sept. 28, 2000	Palestinians initiated riots after Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, which is also the location of the Haram as Sharif holy to Muslims.
Sept. 11, 2001	Terror attacks on World Trade Center in NYC and the Pentagon carried out by fanatic Islamic Al-Qaida group headed by Osama Bin Laden initiate US war on terror. Israel and Palestinians agree to a cease fire, but it is not implemented.
Feb 6, 2001	Right-wing Likud leader Ariel Sharon elected Prime Minister in Israel replacing Ehud Barak and promising "peace and security."
March-April 2002	Israel conducts operation Defensive Wall in the West Bank, following a large number of Palestinian suicide attacks on civilian targets. Saudi peace initiative adopted at Beirut summit.
Jan 28, 2003	Elections in Israel give wide margin (40 seats) to right wing Likud party, returning PM Ariel Sharon for another term.
March 19,2003	US begins invasion of Iraq by a strike against a building where Saddam Hussein and other leaders are meeting. Baghdad falls, April 9.
July 9, 2004	International court of Justice (ICJ) rules that the Israeli security barrier violates international law and must be torn down.
Nov 11, 2004	Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat dies.
Jan 9, 2005	Mahmoud Abbas elected President of the Palestinian National Authority.
Jan 10, 2005	Ariel Sharon forms unity government with Labor and United Torah Judaism parties in Israel.



## APPENDIX TWO - BOUNDARIES ENVISIONED BY THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION <sup>38</sup>

Map of Palestine: The Zionist organization asked to submit its proposals regarding Palestine to the Paris Peace conference in 1919. These proposals were considered as background for the British proposal to be granted a mandate over Palestine in order to create a Jewish national home there, in fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration. Map shows proposed borders - Adapted from Tessler, Mark, *The Israeli Palestinian Conflict*, 1994.






### APPENDIX THREE - MAPS OF THE BRITISH MANDATE<sup>39</sup>

In 1920, Britain received a provisional mandate over Palestine, which would extend west and east of the River Jordan. The area of the mandate (see map below) given to Britain at the San Remo conference was much larger than historic Palestine as envisaged by the [Zionists](#), who had sought an eastern border to the West of Amman. The [mandate](#), based on the Balfour declaration, was formalized in 1922




In 1922, the British declared that the boundary of Palestine would be limited to the area west of the river. The area east of the river, called Transjordan (now Jordan), was made a separate British mandate and eventually given independence (See map below). A part of the Zionist movement felt betrayed at losing a large area of what they termed "historic Palestine" to Transjordan





#### APPENDIX FOUR - PARTITION MAP FOR UN RESOLUTION (GA 181)<sup>40</sup>


The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) recommended that Palestine be divided into an Arab state and a Jewish state. The commission called for Jerusalem to be put under international administration. The UN General Assembly adopted this plan on Nov. 29, 1947 as UN Resolution (GA 181). The plan for "partition with economic union" divided the land into several cantons. Both the Jewish state and the Arab state had 3 cantons each that touched each other south of Nazareth and near Gaza. The borders of this plan are shown in the map below. This jigsaw puzzle would have been difficult to implement for friendly populations, and was impossible to implement given the hostility between Arabs and Jews.






#### APPENDIX FIVE - MAP OF ISRAEL FOLLOWING THE 1967 WAR<sup>41</sup>

The areas shown in bright green (Sinai, Golan Heights, Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem) were occupied by Israel during the 6-day war. Israel has since returned all of Sinai to Egypt in return for peace. Following the 6 day war, Israel began building settlements in these areas.






APPENDIX SIX - PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMP LOCATIONS <sup>42</sup>





APPENDIX SEVEN - ISRAELI SETTLEMENT OUTPOST – JANUARY 2002<sup>43</sup>



Adapted from Foundation for Middle East Peace  
[http://www.finep.org/reports/2002/v12n1\\_p5\\_lg\\_map.html](http://www.finep.org/reports/2002/v12n1_p5_lg_map.html)



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Before publication of the NSS the UN formed the Quartet comprised of the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russian Federation brought together in 2002 by UN Security Council Resolution 1397 to confront the escalating violence and problems arising from the “Al-Aqsa Intifada.”

<sup>2</sup> George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Lecture given at the Middle East Symposium at the U.S. Army War College on 22 March 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Definition of Zionism, A Jewish movement that arose in the late 19th century in response to growing anti-Semitism and sought to reestablish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Modern Zionism is concerned with the support and development of Israel. Note: sections of the information are marked with a warning that the neutrality and factual accuracy of the article are disputed. Definition from <<http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery;jsessionid=3fvbni6dv6euq?method=4&dsid=2222&dekey=Zionism>>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2005.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* Slogan attributed to Israel Zangwill.

<sup>8</sup> The land area included what is now the countries of Israel, Iraq and Jordan as well as the West Bank and Gaza. In a parallel move, France was given what is now Syria and Lebanon to administer.

<sup>9</sup> Definition of Zionism, available from <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zionism>> Internet; accessed 9 March 2005.

<sup>10</sup> After looking at various alternatives, the UN proposed the partitioning of Palestine into two independent States, one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish, with Jerusalem internationalized (Resolution 181 (II) of 1947). One of the two States envisaged in the partition plan proclaimed its independence as Israel and in the 1948 war expanded to occupy 77 per cent of the territory of Palestine. Israel also occupied the larger part of Jerusalem. Over half the indigenous Palestinian population fled or were expelled. Jordan and Egypt occupied the other parts of the territory assigned by the partition resolution to the Palestinian Arab State which did not come into being; available from <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ngo/history.html>>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>11</sup> Source is the MidEastWeb for Coexistence MidEast Web was started by people active in Middle East dialog and peace education efforts. Our goal is to weave a world-wide web of Arabs, Jews and others who want to build a new Middle East based on coexistence and neighborly relations. MidEast Web for Coexistence is a registered non-government organization in Israel; available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/refugees1.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Information about Hamas with the disclaimer that MidEastWeb provides this document and introduction for your information. MidEastWeb does not support Hamas!! In 1987, the Arabs living in the territories occupied by Israeli in the 6-Day war began a series of riots and violent confrontations known as the Intifadeh, a movement quite independent from PLO leadership. Soon after, Islamic militants founded the Hamas movement, which was at first given some encouragement by Israel, as a means of countering the influence of the PLO, and perhaps because the opposition of the Hamas to an international conference that would adjudicate the problem of Palestine, coincided with the policies of the Shamir government. The principles of the Hamas are stated in their Covenant or Charter, given in full below. Following are highlights.

"Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it."

"The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up."

"There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors."

"After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. When they will have digested the region they overtook, they will aspire to further expansion, and so on. Their plan is embodied in the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion", and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying,"

available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>13</sup> General Information about the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ, Arabic Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini) is a militant group, widely regarded as terrorist throughout the world, whose goal is the destruction of the State of Israel and its replacement with an Islamist state for Palestinian Arabs . This group defines jihad as acts of war against Jews and others who do not share their beliefs. Palestinian Islamic Jihad also opposes many other Arab governments , who they see as being insufficiently Islamic and too western. Unlike the far larger Hamas , which split from it, the Islamic Jihad has a small support base, and no real social or political role. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was formed in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s by Fathi Shaqaqi as a branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The group is based in the Syrian capital, Damascus , and its financial backing is believed to come from there and Iran. The group operates primarily in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but has also carried out attacks in Jordan and Lebanon. Its main strongholds in the West Bank are the cities of Hebron and Jenin. Islamic Jihad also uses women and teens as suicide bombers ; available from <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian\\_Islamic\\_Jihad](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_Islamic_Jihad)>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>14</sup> The Land of Israel (Hebrew: Eretz Yisrael) refers to the land making up the ancient Jewish Kingdoms of Israel and Judah. The term has been used by Jews and Christians throughout history. This territory includes the modern State of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as parts of the modern Kingdom of Jordan, south-western Syria, and southern Lebanon. During the British mandate of Palestine, the name Eretz Yisrael (abbreviated Aleph-Yod), was part of the official name of the territory, when written in Hebrew. Consequently, in its modern usage, the term usually denotes only those parts of the land which came under the British mandate, i.e. the land currently occupied by Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, and sometimes also Transjordan (now the Kingdom of Jordan); available from <<http://www.answers.com/eretz%20Israel>>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Security Council resolution 242 (1967) states: "...Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles: Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force; ..." available from <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement>>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Department of State, Israel Profile, October 2003; available from <<http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/i/35872.htm>> Internet; accessed 3 March 2005.

<sup>17</sup> Israel and Palestine: A Brief History, available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>18</sup> Excerpt from The Jewish Virtual Library, The Rogers Plan, 9 December 1969; available from <<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/rogers.html>>; Internet, accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>19</sup> "Jordan Formally Renounced Claims to the West Bank in 1988," available from <<http://www.country-studies.com/jordan/the-rabat-summit-conference.html>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>20</sup> Information from Infoplease, Palestinian Liberation Organization, available from <<http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0837351.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 April 2005

<sup>21</sup> Department of State, FY 2006 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request; available from <<http://www.state.gov.m.rn/rls/iab/2006/html/41794.htm>>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2005.

<sup>22</sup> Hezbollah - or Party of God - emerged in Lebanon in the early 1980s and became the region's leading radical Islamic movement, determined to drive Israeli troops from Lebanon; available from <[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/1908671.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1908671.stm)>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>23</sup> Intifada (also Intefadah or Intifadah; from Arabic: ??? ? ? ? "shaking off") is an Islamic term for uprising. It came into common usage as the popularised name for two recent campaigns directed at ending the Israeli military occupation. It is one of the most significant aspects in recent years of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first Palestinian intifada began in 1987, with a decrease in violence in 1991 and a more complete end with the signing of the Oslo accords (August 1993) and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority. The Al-Aqsa Intifada (also known as the second Palestinian intifada) was the violent Palestinian-Israeli conflict that began on September 29, 2000, when Ariel Sharon and an entourage of 1,000 armed men entered the Al-Aqsa mosque compound; available from <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intifada>>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2005.

<sup>24</sup> The Mitchell Report, 4 May 4 2001; available from <<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/source/Peace/Mitchellrep.html>>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> The Tenet Plan: Israeli-Palestinian Ceasefire and Security Plan, proposed by CIA Director George Tenet; 13 June 2001; available from <<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon/mideast/mid023.htm>>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

<sup>27</sup> Security Council Resolution 1397; available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/2002/sc2002.htm>>; Internet; accessed 26 February 2005.

<sup>28</sup> Security Council Resolutions 1402 and 1403; available from <<http://www.un.org/Docs/2002/sc2002.htm>>; Internet; accessed 26 February 2005.

<sup>29</sup> Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict;" 30 April 2003; available from <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm>>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

<sup>30</sup> Press Statement, US Dept of State 30 April 2003

<sup>31</sup> Quotations from the Al Jazeera English web site. The article that these were attached to (there were 26 pages of comments) is a journalistic account of the 25 February Tel Aviv bombing. The Al Jazeera account roughly paralleled articles in two Israeli publications found online: Ha'aretz and The Jerusalem Post; available from <[http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service\\_ID=7354](http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service_ID=7354)>; Internet; accessed on 26 Feb 2005

<sup>32</sup> Article on refugees ; available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/refugees1.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>33</sup> Geneva Accord (Beilin-Abd-Rabbo Document), Israeli opposition leaders, led by Shahar movement leader Yossi Beilin and Palestinians led by Yasser Abd-Rabbo, negotiated a new draft agreement, that would supposedly replace the Oslo accords as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian peace, October 2003; available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/geneva1.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>34</sup> Multiple Old Testament sources. <http://www.keyway.ca/htm2001/20011022.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>35</sup> Yedidya Atlas, Israel's Water Basics; Yedidya Atlas is a senior correspondent and commentator for Arutz-7 Israel National Radio. He also serves on the advisory committee of the Freeman Center For Strategic Studies;available from <[http://www.freeman.org/m\\_online/nov99/atlas.htm](http://www.freeman.org/m_online/nov99/atlas.htm)>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>36</sup> Article on the Dead Sea, available from <[http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\\_761556205/Dead\\_Sea.html](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761556205/Dead_Sea.html)>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>37</sup> "Timeline of Palestinian Israeli History and the Israel-Arab Conflict;" available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/timeline.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>38</sup> Map shows proposed borders - Adapted from Tessler, Mark, The Israeli Palestinian Conflict, 1994; available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/zionistborders.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>39</sup> Two maps showing the British Mandate originally and after separation into separate administrative districts ; available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005..

<sup>40</sup> Partition Map Of the United Nations Plan; available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/unpartition.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>41</sup> Map of Israel following the 1967 War; available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/israelafter1967.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>42</sup> Map of Israeli Settlement Outpost in January 2002 ; available from <[http://www.fmep.org/reports/2002/v12n1\\_p5\\_lg\\_map.html](http://www.fmep.org/reports/2002/v12n1_p5_lg_map.html)>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.

<sup>43</sup> Map of Palestinian Refugee Camp Locations ; available from <<http://www.mideastweb.org/mrefugees.htm>>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2005.



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